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We analyse policymakers’ incentives to ﬁght corruption under different institutional qual- 
ities. We ﬁnd that ‘public oﬃcials’, even when non-corrupt, signiﬁcantly distort anti- 
corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability 
applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (le- 
gal inequality). More surprising perhaps is the ﬁnding that policy-makers do not choose a 
zero level of detection on average, even when it applies to them too. Finally, corruption is 
signiﬁcantly lower when the detection probability is exogenously set, suggesting that the 
institutional power to choose detection can itself be corruptive. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
The ﬁght against corruption has resulted in strikingly few success stories ( Heeks and Mathisen, 2012; Mutebi, 2008 ).
While there are many clear practical diﬃculties in this ﬁght, part of the failure is explicable by the unwillingness of some
governments to try to eliminate or even curb corruption ( Fritzen, 2005 ). This is most likely to be a problem in weak insti-
tutional environments where the policy makers are themselves corrupt. A key issue in the ﬁght against corruption is that
‘anticorruption strategies are adopted and implemented in cooperation with the very predators who control the government
and, in some cases, the anticorruption instruments themselves’ ( Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006 : 87). 
This paper describes the results of a framed laboratory experiment designed to analyse policy-makers’ incentives to ﬁght
corruption under different institutional settings. The basic design of our repeated-game experiment is as follows. In the∗ Corresponding author. 
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 Control treatment, in each round, two randomly matched public oﬃcials, A and B, are entrusted with separate funds to be
spent on (different) social projects. Each public oﬃcial can embezzle some of the fund under their control. The amounts
sent to the social projects are multiplied by 2 while the amounts embezzled by oﬃcials A and B are multiplied by 1.
Thus embezzlement is socially ineﬃcient. As there is no monitoring and punishment, the Control treatment mimics an
institutional environment where there is total impunity regarding corruption. 
There are three additional treatments with detection and punishment. 1 In the ﬁrst treatment (Endogenous and Discre-
tionary, ED), Public Oﬃcial A has the power to choose a level of detection probability, which can take the following values:
0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, or 30%. Detection and punishment applies only to Public Oﬃcial B. This is analogous to a weak
institutional environment, with endogenous detection and discretionary punishment institutions; for example, where the
judicial and police systems act in the service of the government (as opposed to the state). As a result, opposition leaders
are jailed while government supporters are shielded from prosecution. In the second treatment (Endogenous and Non-
Discretionary, END), Public Oﬃcial A is again given the power to choose a level of detection probability but detection and
punishment applies both to Public Oﬃcial A and Public Oﬃcial B. This situation can also be described as a weak institutional
environment, with endogenous detection but non-discretionary punishment institutions, for example, when the judicial and
police systems work independently, but under ‘manipulable’ monitoring and punishment institutions. In the third treatment
(Exogenous and Non-Discretionary, XND), the probability of detection is set exogenously at 30% and applies to both public
oﬃcials. This situation reﬂects a strong institutional environment, with non-discretionary punishment and exogenous detec-
tion and punishment mechanisms, for example, a state where the judicial and police systems work independently, under
non-discretionary strong punishment laws. 
The analyses in this paper focus on choices made by Public Oﬃcial A, particularly in treatments where he/she has the
power to choose the probability for detecting and punishing embezzlement. We ﬁnd that Public Oﬃcial As choose a weaker,
though non-zero, anti-corruption policy in the Endogenous and Non-Discretionary treatment when they too are subject
to its provisions, compared to the Endogenous and Discretionary treatment where they are not subject to its provisions.
Deﬁning corrupt and honest behaviour by a participant’s actions in a given round, even an honest Public Oﬃcial A will
choose a weaker anti-corruption policy when it notionally applies to him too. We also ﬁnd some evidence that corrupt
decision makers in the Endogenous and Non-Discretionary treatment tend to impose a larger distortion than their corrupt
counterparts in the Endogenous and Discretionary treatment, suggesting complementarity between two acts of corruption:
embezzlement and institutional distortion. However, it is worth noting that in both the Endogenous and Discretionary and
Endogenous and Non-Discretionary treatments, the choice of detection probability is signiﬁcantly different from zero. This
suggests that, despite the distortion caused by a weak institutional setting, there is some scope for anti-corruption law-
making. The implications of our ﬁndings are therefore not entirely pessimistic and they should be of practical value and
interest to both domestic and external anti-corruption actors in developing and transition countries. Finally, the level of
corruption is found to be signiﬁcantly lower when detection levels are exogenously set by the experimenter compared to
the treatments with endogenous detection, suggesting that institutional power can be corruptive. 
The expected result in this paper is the ﬁnding that people distort institutions when their own payoff is at risk. Yet
this fact seems to have been neglected in thinking about anti-corruption policy formation as government incentives to
ﬁght corruption are typically taken for granted. In particular, we have a see-saw effect, where an im provement in one
institutional dimension (equality before the law) leads to a negative effect in that detection and punishment institutions
are weakened. It should be noted however that our other results are more surprising. First, honest oﬃcials who have no
payment at stake due to higher detection risks, are not more severe towards corruption than corrupt oﬃcials in either of
the endogenous treatments suggesting that an “honest” policy-maker may not necessarily be an anti-corruption champion.
Second, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between honest oﬃcials in the Endogenous and Non-Discretionary and Endogenous
and Discretionary treatments, with honest oﬃcials in the former treatment choosing a lower detection probability; which
points to an unintended and undesirable consequence of equality before the law. Finally, the fact that some people will
choose positive (and even high) probabilities is encouraging (see Appendix A for a theoretical justiﬁcation); especially in the
Endogenous and Non-Discretionary treatment where our policymakers are at risk from their own choice of detection level.
This result may be explained by the fact that corruption is considered as “bad” and making no effort to ﬁght it may provoke
cognitive dissonance. 2 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and further motivates our work
in its light; Section 3 outlines in full our experimental design; Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Our work is related to the sizeable experimental literature that has examined corruption and anti-corruption policies. 3
In particular, our work builds on a literature that investigates the role of monitoring and punishment; both in bribery and1 In case of embezzlement, a detected public oﬃcial loses both their salary and the amount embezzled. 
2 Cognitive dissonance refers to cases where there is a conﬂict between beliefs (corruption is bad) and behaviour (I embezzle funds); thereby provoking 
some discomfort and related actions to reduce that discomfort. 
3 A comprehensive and relatively recent review of this literature is provided by Abbink and Serra (2012) while Rocha Menocal et al. (2015) review the 
broader literature on what works in anti-corruption. 
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 embezzlement contexts. In a bribery experiment, Abbink et al. (2002) show that a small exogenous probability of detection
(0.3%) combined with severe punishment (whereby detected subjects are excluded from the experiment without any pay-
ment) signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood of sending or accepting a bribe. Likewise, in a complex multi-stage embezzlement
experiment with endogenous monitoring instead of an exogenous detection probability, Azfar and Nelson (2007) ﬁnd that
monitoring signiﬁcantly discourages corrupt behaviour. Building on Azfar and Nelson (2007) ’s design, Barr et al. (2009) show
a relatively strong effect of detection and punishment on corruption. They ﬁnd that a 44% increase in detection probability
leads to a 27% decrease in embezzled resources. Using a natural ﬁeld experiment in Indonesia, Olken (2007) ﬁnds that in-
creasing the audit probability from 4% in the Control treatment to 100% reduces embezzlement of project expenditures by
an average of 8%, suggesting low economic signiﬁcance. Overall, these experiments suggest that monitoring and punishment
can indeed curb corruption. 
However, a few experiments have highlighted possible negative behavioural effects of monitoring and punishment. In
particular, Schulze and Frank (2003) conducted an experiment in which the probability of detection increases with the
bribe taken. The risk rises from 0% for the lowest bribe to 67% for the two highest bribes. They ﬁnd that 9.4% of subjects
take no bribe in the Control treatment (with no monitoring) compared to only 0.9% in the treatment with monitoring and
punishment. Additionally, with monitoring and punishment, subjects are more likely to choose the median bribe amount
(compared to the lowest and the highest bribes), leading to a higher average bribe. The authors argue that monitoring and
punishment deters subjects from the highest bribe levels (due to higher detection levels), but also crowds out intrinsic mo-
tivation for honesty or lowest bribe levels. In a one-shot bribery experiment, Serra (2012) ﬁnds that traditional monitoring
and punishment (with a 4% detection risk) does not curb corruption signiﬁcantly compared to a no-monitoring treatment.
However, combining bottom-up monitoring (whistleblowing) and top-down auditing appears to have a negative effect on
bribery. The author advances three possible reasons for this result: fear of social disapproval in the form of citizens’ reports,
aversion to betrayal, and/or erroneous attribution of a higher probability of punishment. 
Institutional and organizational features have been shown to play a role in determining corruption outcomes.
Abbink (2004) ﬁnds that staff rotation reduces the frequency of bribery. Relatedly, Schikora (2011) concludes that the ‘four-
eyes principle’ actually increases corruption, all else being equal. Azfar and Nelson (2007) ﬁnd that elected enforcement
oﬃcers work harder at curbing corruption relative to those who are appointed to the role. Abbink and Ellman (2010) ﬁnd
that the use of intermediaries by aid donors to target beneﬁciaries can lead to increased embezzlement. Legal asymmetries
in punishment for bribers and bribe takers have been studied in terms of collusive and harassment bribery with differing
conclusions. Engel et al. (2013) conduct an experiment regarding the former type of bribery and conclude that legal asym-
metries increase corruption by giving the briber a credible way to enforce the corrupt transaction. Abbink et al. (2014) ,
however, ﬁnd that in the context of harassment bribes, legal asymmetry can reduce corruption (though this effect is miti-
gated by the threat of retaliation). Makowsky and Wang (2015) show that an organization’s shape is important in terms of
embezzlement outcomes, in that an increase in the number of tiers is detrimental with regard to this type of corruption. 
We contribute to this experimental literature on institutions and corruption in two ways. First, we analyse policy-makers’
incentives to ﬁght corruption. This has typically been put aside in the experimental literature on corruption, despite being
of prime importance in successfully ﬁghting corruption ( Abbink and Serra, 2012 ). 4 Second, most developing and transition
countries are characterized by weak institutional environments. Such an environment has typically been modelled in cor-
ruption experiments in a restrictive way, mainly by setting a low and exogenous detection probability ( Abbink et al., 2002;
Serra, 2012 ). 5 In contrast to previous studies, we create a richer institutional framework by disaggregating institutional qual-
ity into two concepts in our design—equality before the law and manipulability. 6 
Equality before the law is the principle that all persons should be treated the same before the law, without regard
to wealth, social status, or political power. In weak institutional environments (in particular), equality before the law is
unlikely to hold as a result of selective enforcement. Manipulability is the extent to which institutions can be manipulated.
The less manipulable institutions are the more stable they can be. The concept of manipulability acknowledges the fact that
developing countries are typically characterized by the ability of the elite to deliberately manipulate institutions to their
advantage ( North et al., 2009; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2008 ). The concept of manipulability is thus closely related to the
idea of state capture as deﬁned by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002 : 30): 
State capture is deﬁned as the undue and illicit inﬂuence of the elite in shaping the laws, policies and regulations of the
state. In its emphasis on the formulation and shaping of laws and regulations of the state, state capture departs from the
conventional view of corruption which stresses bribery to inﬂuence the implementation of such laws and regulations . 4 For instance, in their chapter on anti-corruption policies in the lab, Abbink and Serra (2012 : 5, 6) discussed strategies to ﬁght corruption speciﬁcally 
abstracting from the problem of a government’s commitment to such a ﬁght. 
5 A notable example of endogenous detection probability is Berninghaus et al. (2013) , where the probability of detection falls with the number of corrupt 
agents. Compared to Azfar and Nelson (20 07) and Barr et al. (20 09) who also implemented endogenous monitoring, our design is much simpler. 
6 Equality before the law and manipulability can be seen as speciﬁc aspects of two other concepts—enforcement and stability—used by Levitsky and 
Murillo (2009) to characterize institutional strength. Enforcement can be deﬁned as the imposition of material, political, or reputational costs on non- 
compliance with the law. Stability can be deﬁned as the extent to which institutions survive not only the test of time but also changes in the conditions 
under which they were initially created. 
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 In our experimental framework, the move from ED to END is an improvement along the equality dimension holding ma-
nipulability constant. The move from either the Control treatment or XND to END constitutes an increase in manipulability,
holding equality constant. Moving from any other treatment to END also opens the door to another form of corruption,
namely abusing the public power to choose the strength of the anti-corruption policy in order to facilitate one’s own em-
bezzling. In other words, the END treatment allows for state capture. 
3. Experimental design 
In this section, we discuss the experimental procedures, followed by a description of the experimental treatments. Before
doing so, it can be noted that a typical concern regarding lab experiments such as this one relates to external validity. A
ﬁrst concern is the artiﬁciality of the setting which may stem from the fact that some ﬁeld factors are omitted in the lab
( Schram, 2005 ). However, according to Friedman and Sunder (1994 , p.11), trying to replicate every aspect of the ﬁeld in the
lab is futile. The focus should be on ﬁnding the simplest laboratory environment that integrates the most interesting aspects
of the ﬁeld environment (as done when building e.g. theoretical models). Second, a distinction between “qualitative” and
“quantitative” external validity is relevant; and as most lab experiments aim to investigate comparative statics, attention
should focus mainly on qualitative external validity ( Camerer, 2014; Kessler and Vesterlund, 2014 ). 7 Third, the problem of
external validity extends to any empirical results obtained from the analysis of data collected in a speciﬁc context ( Falk and
Heckman, 2009; Kessler and Vesterlund, 2014 ). Furthermore, experimental economics has proved to be most useful in at
least three situations which all apply in the context of studying corruption (see Armantier and Boly, 2012 ). The ﬁrst is when
relevant naturally-occurring or observational data are not available or are very challenging to obtain. The second situation is
when one wishes to identify the micro-determinants of corrupt behaviour and anti-corruption policymaking, which remain
essentially unanswered due to scarce observational data. Third, lab experiments provide a cost effective “wind tunnel” for
anti-corruption policymaking in this regard ( Dusek et al., 2005; Abbink, 2006 ). Finally, it is worth noting the ﬁndings of
Armantier and Boly (2013) who directly addressed this issue by comparing results from a ﬁeld experiment in Burkina Faso
and lab experiments in Burkina Faso and Canada. Their results suggest external validity of lab experiments on corruption,
although additional studies are desirable. 
3.1. Procedure 
Our framed lab experiment was conducted at the Busara Centre for Behavioural Economics in Nairobi, Kenya. The sub-
jects were recruited primarily from the University of Nairobi and came from a variety of study ﬁelds. At the beginning of
each session, the instructions were read aloud and subjects were invited to ask clariﬁcation questions. After this, their un-
derstanding of the task at hand was tested with comprehension questions displayed, and answered, on individual computer
screens. These comprehension questions had to be answered correctly before the participant could progress to the decision
making phase of the experiment. Each session lasted about one hour. 
In our experiment, we model embezzlement, which occurs when the embezzler misuses (typically for private gains) an-
other party’s money or property, to which they have legal access but not legal ownership; for example, when public funds
are captured by oﬃcials or politicians. In Uganda, Svensson and Renikka (2004) show that during 1991–1995, schools re-
ceived, on average only 13% of funds disbursed by the Ugandan government; while most schools received nothing. The bulk
of the school grant was captured by local oﬃcials (and politicians). Likewise, in Chad, Gauthier and Wane (2009) show that
while the regional administration is oﬃcially allocated 60% of the ministry’s non-wage recurrent expenditures, only 18%
actually reached the regions and only 1% reached the health centres, which are the frontline providers and the entry point
for the population. Francken et al. (2009) also ﬁnd evidence of embezzlement in public funds destined for schools in Mada-
gascar. In Indonesia, Suryadarma and Yamauchi (2013) ﬁnd that only 69% of disbursements were actually received by the
intended beneﬁciaries of an anti-poverty program. In all cases above, embezzlers clearly undermine economic development
by diverting resources allocated to education, health or poverty-reduction programs. 
Speciﬁcally, the experiment is based on a sequential-move game with two players, called Public Oﬃcial A and Public Of-
ﬁcial B. 8 Each subject kept the same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each round, new pairs (consisting
of one Public Oﬃcial A and one Public Oﬃcial B) were formed randomly. Participants entered their decisions on computer
terminals. Public Oﬃcial As were unaware of the identity or decision of their matched partner for the ﬁrst 20 rounds. Even
if participants were to encounter someone that they had already been matched with, they would have no way of knowing7 Qualitative external validity only requires the direction of a causal effect to extend beyond the lab, whereas quantitative external validity additionally 
needs the causal effect be of similar size inside and outside the lab. 
8 The use of framed instructions in corruption experiments is common (see e.g. Cameron et al., 2009 ; Armantier and Boly, 2013 ; Abbink et al., 2014; 
Banerjee and Mitra, 2018 ). We follow the same approach as corruption differs from other crimes in that it involves public malfeasance. By using the label 
of “public oﬃcial” and having a charity or NGO serve as the third party who stands to be harmed by the public oﬃcials’ actions, we operationalize this 
important aspect of the “real world” phenomenon we are interested in. However, there is a debate in the literature as to whether corruption experiments 
should be framed or neutral. For example, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant difference between context-free and in-context 
presentation of experimental tasks in a corruption experiment while Barr and Serra (2009) ﬁnd some framing effects only for subjects in a speciﬁc role 
(citizens) 
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 this. During the experiment, the payoffs were measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). At the end of the experiment,
the amount in ECU was converted into Kenyan Shillings at the rate of 8 ECU = 1 KSh. 
In each round, both Public Oﬃcial A and Public Oﬃcial B receive a salary of 1,140 ECU. In addition, they are both allocated
funds amounting to 2280 ECU, to spend on ‘social projects’. Public Oﬃcial A, the ﬁrst mover, must then choose between
keeping 0 ECU and keeping 760 ECU from the allocated funds. The amount of ECU that they choose to keep is transferred
to their private account. The remainder (2280 less the amount kept) is multiplied by 2, converted into Kenyan Shillings, and
sent to a recipient, called Recipient 1, that is randomly drawn from a list of local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
and local charity funds. 9 
Public Oﬃcial B makes their decisions only after observing the decisions made by Public Oﬃcial A. In contrast to Public
Oﬃcial A, Public Oﬃcial B can keep any whole number between 0 and 2280 ECU from their allocated funds. The amount
that Public Oﬃcial B chooses to keep is transferred to their private account. The remainder (2280 less the amount kept) is
multiplied by 2, converted into Kenyan Shillings, and sent to a recipient, called Recipient 2 that is different from Recipient
1 and is also randomly drawn from a list of local NGOs and local charity funds. 10 
The experiment consisted of 40 rounds. In the ﬁrst 20 rounds, Public Oﬃcial A receives no information about the choice
made by Public Oﬃcial B. From round 21 onwards, Public Oﬃcial A was able to observe the amount that was transferred to
Recipient 2 by Public Oﬃcial B. After completing all 40 rounds, all subjects were asked to ﬁll in a questionnaire demographic
survey, which included questions on, inter alia, age, gender, monthly expenses, and education. 
3.2. Treatments 
Our objective is to better understand the workings of detection and punishment as an anti-corruption measure. To do
so, we conducted four experimental treatments, three of which include detection and punishment. If a public oﬃcial’s em-
bezzlement is detected then the public oﬃcial loses both their salary and the amount embezzled. In the Control treatment,
Public Oﬃcial A and Public Oﬃcial B make their decisions in the absence of any detection and punishment institutions
following the game described above. 
In the second treatment (ED), Public Oﬃcial A is given the power to choose a level of detection probability, which can
take one of the following values: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, or 30%. However, detection and punishment institutions apply
only to Public Oﬃcial B, thereby breaking the principle of equality before the law. In other words, Public Oﬃcial A can
be corrupt with impunity while Public Oﬃcial B faces the prospect of detection and punishment. As a result, detection is
endogenously chosen and punishment is discretionary. The choices made by Public Oﬃcial A relative to embezzlement and
the level of detection are observed by Public Oﬃcial B before they make their decision; while Public Oﬃcial A observes the
choices made by Public Oﬃcial B only after round 20. 11 If detected, Public Oﬃcial B loses both their salary and the amount
of social funds embezzled. 
In the third treatment (END), Public Oﬃcial A is again given the power to choose a level of detection probability (from
among the values above) but detection and punishment apply both to Public Oﬃcial A and B. So while the principle of
equality before the law is respected, the monitoring and punishment institutions are chosen by Public Oﬃcial A, and are
therefore open to manipulation. If detected, Public Oﬃcial A and/or Public Oﬃcial B lose both their salary and the amount
embezzled. Independent and separate draws are carried out for Public Oﬃcial A and for Public Oﬃcial B. This means that
one of the public oﬃcials can be detected and punished, while the other is not. As in the second treatment, Public Oﬃcial
B observes the choices made by Public Oﬃcial A relative to embezzlement and the level of detection. 
In the fourth treatment (XND), the probability of detection is set exogenously at 30% and applies to both public oﬃcials.
As a result, the detection and punishment policy is stable throughout and cannot be manipulated by Public Oﬃcial A as in
ED and END treatments. Independent and separate draws are carried out for Public Oﬃcial A and for Public Oﬃcial B. This
treatment therefore also features equality before the law in terms of process, if not in terms of outcomes. 
3.3. Detection and punishment mechanism 
The monitoring mechanism is implemented as follows. A random number between 1 and 100 is generated after the pub-
lic oﬃcials have made their decisions. In the treatments where both public oﬃcials are subject to the mechanism, separate
and independent draws are made for each person. If the chosen (or exogenously given) probability is 30% and the randomly
generated number falls between 1 and 30 then one’s decision to keep some positive amount of the social funds is detected.
If detected, punishment is automatic and means that for that speciﬁc round the public oﬃcial receives no salary and loses9 As discussed by Abbink and Serra (2012) , the use of NGOs or charities as recipients of non-embezzled funds is a useful way to model the negative 
impact of corruption on public well-being. There are, however, two potential issues. First, there may be some loss of control regarding a subject attitude 
towards a particular NGO or charity. To mitigate this effect, we sim ply informed the subject that the local NGO would be drawn randomly from a list. 
Second, subjects’ donation behaviour outside the experiment is unknown, if the subject had already given to a charity recently or if he/she decides to be 
corrupt in the experiment and give later. This may, however, be a non-optimal choice given the multiplicative factor in our experiment. 
10 We chose two different recipients, one for Public Oﬃcial A and another for Public Oﬃcial B, in order to make sure that A’s choice does not substitute 
for the choice made by B or inﬂuence its marginal effect (see e.g. Francois, 20 0 0, 20 03 for further theorizing as to why such issues may matter, but in a 
slightly different context). 
11 While embezzlement may not be directly observed in real life, income-related changes (people living outside their means) are typically observed. 
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Table 1 
Details of the detection mechanism. 
Numbers are generated between 1 and 100 
Probability values (%) Randomly generated numbers for which a player loses 
both their salary and the amount of the social fund kept. 
Randomly generated numbers for which a player retains 
both their salary and the amount of the social fund kept. 
0 Never Always 
5 1,…, 5 6,…, 100 
10 1,…, 10 11,…, 100 
15 1,…, 15 16,…, 100 
20 1,…, 20 21,…, 100 
25 1,…, 25 26,…, 100 
30 1,…, 30 31,…, 100 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the embezzled funds. This does not affect the payoffs in future or past rounds. If the randomly generated number falls be-
tween 31 and 100 then the public oﬃcial in question retains both the salary and the amount kept. Table 1 summarizes the
monitoring mechanism according to the probability values. The monitoring mechanism is identical in all three treatments
with detection and punishment. In the Control and XND treatments the value is exogenously set at 0% and 30% respectively.
3.4. Participants and payoffs 
In total, 262 subjects participated in the four treatments; half (131) as Public Oﬃcial A and the other half as Public
Oﬃcial B. Precisely 64 subjects participated in the Control treatment, 64 in the ED treatment, 68 in the END treatment, and
66 in the XND treatment. Out of the 40 periods, only one period was chosen at random to compute a subject’s ﬁnal payoff.
For those in the role of Public Oﬃcial A, the average earnings (including the salary and the embezzled funds) were 196 KSh
in the Control treatment, 208 KSh in the ED treatment, 194 KSh in the END treatment, and 145 KSh in the XND treatment.
Given that 40% of our public oﬃcial As reported a monthly income of less than 50 0 0 KSh and 19% a monthly income of less
than 20 0 0 KSh these are meaningful stakes and signiﬁcant returns for an hour or so of work. For those serving as Public
Oﬃcial B, the average earnings (including the salary and the embezzled funds) were 292 KSh in the Control treatment,
307 KSh in the ED treatment, 306 KSh in the END treatment, and 185 KSh in the XND treatment. In addition, each subject
received a ﬁxed payment of 400 KSh for their participation. 
Two NGOs, Green Belt Movement and Impacting Youth Trust (Mathare), were randomly selected from a list of local
NGOs and served as Recipient 1 and Recipient 2 respectively. They received 48,285 KSh and 58,900 KSh respectively. These
amounts were computed as the total of the amounts sent to Recipient 1 (Recipient 2) by Public Oﬃcial As (Public Oﬃcial
Bs), using one randomly selected period per subject and the exchange rate of 8 ECU = 1 KSh. Participants were notiﬁed when
these payments had been made and invited to view documentary evidence of the payments. 
4. Results 
In this paper, we are interested in the choices of Public Oﬃcial A. In particular, we are interested in Public Oﬃcial A’s
choice regarding the strength of the anti-corruption policy. We analyse only the ﬁrst 20 periods, in which Public Oﬃcial A
receives no information about the choice and identity of Public Oﬃcial B. 12 We start by giving some theoretical predictions
before presenting subject pool characteristics. We then conduct statistical tests, typically using Chi-square tests for the bi-
nary corruption decision and Mann–Whitney tests for the choices of detection levels. Finally, we use regression analysis to
analyse Public Oﬃcial As’ decisions. We report regression results obtained from including only the treatments, and those
obtained from including additional covariates in different columns. In addition to standard the standard characteristics of
age, gender and dummies capturing whether the student is an economics major and their own experience of corruption,
we include “Own means of transportation” as a proxy for subjects’ assets (or wealth) as it is plausible that this can have an
impact on the decision to embezzle funds or not. Wealthier students in developing countries would typically own bicycles,
motorcycles or even cars depending on family wealth. We discuss only the results obtained with covariates included, noting
that they do not change when only treatments are included. All speciﬁcations include round ﬁxed effects to allow for the
possibility that decisions vary over the course of the experiment. 
4.1. Subject pool 
Table 2 presents summary statistics regarding the basic characteristics of the Public Oﬃcial As in our subject pool. The
participants in each treatment are on average 21 years old and in their second year of study. There are some differences12 From period 21 onwards, Public Oﬃcial A was able to observe the amount that was transferred to Recipient 2 by Public Oﬃcial B, creating endogeneity 
and interdependency. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics of Public Oﬃcial A characteristics. 
Variables Control ED END XND Kruskal–Wallis 
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) ( p -value) 
Age 21.56 21.09 20.97 20.67 0.2941 
(1.97) (2.19) (1.62) (2.06) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.64 0.4237 
(0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.49) 
Economics major 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.52 0.7314 
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.51) 
Has been asked for a bribe (0 if Never) 0.59 0.66 0.62 0.73 0.6918 
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) 
Owns means of transportation 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.0717 
(0.30) (0.18) (0.00) (0.36) 
Observations 32 32 34 33 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 across the treatments in terms of the gender composition. Gender has been found by some researchers to be important for
corrupt behaviour and attitudes to corruption ( Dollar et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2011; Rivas 2013 ). Thus, while this difference
is not as pronounced between ED and END as it is with these treatments and the exogenous treatments, it will be important
to control for the effect of gender in our regression analysis. 
The answers to the post-experiment questionnaire suggest that our subjects were well acquainted with corruption, knew
the legal situation in Kenya regarding bribery, and felt that corruption by government oﬃcials is morally questionable. Of
participants in the role of Public Oﬃcial A, 65% have paid a bribe in some circumstance. The most common bribery situations
our subjects have encountered are having to pay a bribe to avoid problems with the police (17%) and to get an identity
document (15%). Further, 69% believe that some government oﬃcials are involved in corruption in their country and 27%
believe that all of them are engaged in such activities. 
Our post-experiment survey also included questions on corruption. The majority of our subjects (60%) most often hear
about corruption in the context of politicians and bureaucrats with the bulk of the remainder (31%) most commonly being
aware of corruption in terms of harassment of ordinary people for basic services. Eighty-six per cent of people understood
that ‘if caught, both the bribe giver and taker are committing an illegal act’, while 8% thought that only the briber taker is
breaking the law. Taken together this conﬁrms that almost all of our subjects knew that bribe-taking is legally prohibited in
their country. Finally, 95% of our subjects agreed that ‘it is always wrong for a government oﬃcial to take a bribe.’ 
We begin by brieﬂy describing and analysing the patterns in Public Oﬃcial As’ corrupt behaviour before moving on to
the main focus of the paper: an analysis of the choice of detection probability. 
4.2. Corrupt behaviour 
Public Oﬃcial As faced a binary corruption choice, as he/she could embezzle either 0 ECU or 760 ECU. They could either
embezzle a third of the social fund under their control or they could take nothing for themselves. 
Assuming deterrence is effective in curbing corrupt behaviour, we expect the level of corrupt behaviour to be the same
in the Control and the ED treatment given that the probability of detection and punishment is zero for Public Oﬃcial A in
both cases. In the END treatment, the level of corruption will depend on the level of detection chosen by Public Oﬃcial A
who is herself subject to detection and punishment. As shown in Appendix A , in the END treatment, detection needs only
to be below a certain level but not necessarily equal to zero in order for a Public Oﬃcial A to expect positive rewards from
embezzlement. Assuming a positive level of detection, we expect to see a lower level of corruption in the END treatment,
compared to the Control or ED treatments. Finally, we expect corruption to be lowest in the XND treatment where the
probability of detection is 30%. In summary, we anticipate C ( C ontrol ) = C( ED ) > C( END ) > C( XND ) , where C(.) is the expected
level of corruption. 
The share of corrupt decisions in the Control, ED, END, and XND treatments are respectively 57%, 74%, 74%, and 60%. 13 
Two things are noteworthy. First, the lowest proportion of corrupt decisions is to be found in our Control treatment, where
there was no chance of detection and punishment. The second least corrupt institutional setting was the XND treatment,
where the detection probability was exogenously given. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between the Control and XND
treatments ( p -value = 0.421, chi-square test). Although seemingly puzzling in light of the ﬁndings of Abbink et al. (2002) and
others, there are several possible explanations. 
First, several studies have shown that monitoring and punishment can destroy intrinsic motivation; and that this crowd-
ing out effect can be larger than its disciplining effects (see e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 20 0 0; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fehr
and Rockenbach, 2003; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006 ). The similar level of embezzlement in the Control and the XND treatment13 In the Control, ED, END, and XND treatments, there are respectively 5, 1, 1, and 5 oﬃcials who are always honest; 18, 18, 21, and 24 oﬃcials who are 
occasionally corrupt; and 9, 13, 12, and 4 oﬃcials who are always corrupt. 
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 could be explained by the fact intrinsic motivation is at play and at its strongest in the Control treatment where there is no
monitoring and punishment. This may be strengthened by the restriction that Public Oﬃcial A could embezzle only 0 ECU
or 760 ECU from the allocated funds (amounting to 2280 ECU). 14 However, in the XND treatment, the level of detection (set
at 30%) is such that the crowding out effects of monitoring are large enough to cancel out its disciplining effects; leading to
the same level of corruption as in the Control treatment. Such a result could suggest an inverted U-shape for the effects of
exogenous monitoring and punishment on corruption but we do not have enough data to verify such a claim. 
Furthermore, the absence of effects on monitoring is not unheard of. For example, Gërxhani and Schram (2006) ﬁnd
that tax evasion in Albania is not affected by the audit probability. Moving from a 16.67% detection rate to 50%, resulted
in a tax evasion decrease from 11% to 10%. However, the same levels of detection in the Netherlands led to a meaning-
ful decrease in tax evasion from 58% to 39%. This is explained by the fact that Albanians were already very compliant
when detection was weak. An additional treatment with no audit in Albania also resulted in high levels of compliance.
Armantier and Boly (2013) also ﬁnd a similar result in their corruption experiments conducted in Ouagadougou (Burkina
Faso) and Montreal (Canada). In the Control treatments of their lab experiments (where there was no monitoring), 48.5%
of subjects accepted bribes in Ouagadougou, compared to 66.7% of subjects in Montreal. So the lack of monitoring effects
may be partly explain by the already low level of corruption in our Control treatment, which signiﬁcantly departs from
proﬁt-maximization behaviour typically found in developed countries. This is an issue that future research could fruitfully
examine. A further explanation for this seemingly anomalous result is provided by Banerjee and Mitra (2018) . They show
that a high detection probability (0.4) and a small ﬁne has no effect on bribe taking behaviour, compared to a treatment
with no monitoring. Such a result can be related to ours, assuming that the penalty in the XND treatment (losing salary and
embezzlement in one round that may not be selected for the purposes of payment) was not seen as high. Finally, it should
be noted that the comparison between our treatments with exogenous detection is not central to our focus in this paper. 
Relative to the Control treatment, corruption is signiﬁcantly higher in the ED treatment (at the 1% level, p -value = 0.0 0 0,
chi-square test) as well as in the END treatment ( p -value = 0.0 0 0, chi-square test). Compared to the XND treatment, we ﬁnd
that corruption is signiﬁcantly higher both in the ED treatment (at the 1% level, p -value = 0.0 0 0, chi-square test) and in the
END treatment (at the 1% level, p -value = 0.0 0 0, chi-square test). 
The second thing to note is that the share of corrupt decisions seems to be the same, at 74%, in both ED and END. We
ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant difference between the two institutional frameworks ( p -value = 0.985, chi-square test). Recall
that the move from ED to END represents an improvement in the equality-before-the-law dimension of institutional quality
holding manipulability constant. This improvement in equality does not change the corrupt behaviour of Public Oﬃcial A. 
To further examine Public Oﬃcial A’s decision regarding corruption, we use a random-effects Logit model. The dependent
variable (Corrupt choice) takes a value of 1 if the public oﬃcial chose to embezzle some of the funds entrusted to them
and 0 otherwise. Also, recall that A does not observes the choices made by Public Oﬃcial B for the 20 ﬁrst rounds that we
are analysing in this paper. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 presents the results. Column 1 includes only the treatments while
Column 4 includes additional covariates. We discuss the results reported in Column 4 in Table 3 . They show that there are
signiﬁcant differences in the propensity to be corrupt between the Control treatment and both the ED and END treatments
at the 5% level. The result indicates that obtaining institutional power can increase the propensity to embezzle, in line with
the psychological ﬁnding that power can corrupt by leading people to place greater importance on their self-interests (see
e.g. DeCelles et al., 2012 ). In the ED treatment, Public Oﬃcial A is given institutional power while being shielded from pun-
ishment. This may be taken as encouragement to be corrupt. In the END treatment, Public Oﬃcial A may set the detection
probability to 0 in order to shield themselves from punishment. In comparing the equality of coeﬃcients between the XND
treatment and the ED treatment, we ﬁnd that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level ( p -value = 0.009). A similar
result is found when comparing the XND and the END treatments ( p -value = 0.009). No signiﬁcant difference is found be-
tween the ED and the END treatment ( p -value = 0.9196); or between the Control and the XND treatments ( p -value = 0.572).
We include control variables for age, gender and having a history of experience with bribery. With the exception of age at
the 10% level, these controls are not signiﬁcant. Pursuing a major in Economics predicts corrupt behaviour signiﬁcantly at
the 10% level (see e.g. Frank and Schulze 20 0 0 ). 
4.3. Choice of detection probability 
Summary statistics regarding the probability of detection and punishment chosen by Public Oﬃcial A are given in Table 4 .
Recall that the detection rate is exogenously set at 0% and 30% in the Control and XND treatments respectively. 
Using individuals’ average choices as independent units of observations, we ﬁnd that the average detection probability
chosen in the ED treatment is signiﬁcantly greater than 0% and signiﬁcantly lower than 30% despite detection being costless
for and not applicable to Public Oﬃcial A (1% level, one-sample t -test). When public oﬃcials have the ability to set an anti-
corruption policy that will not apply to themselves but will constrain the corrupt activities of others, they choose a non-
zero level of detection and punishment but they do not impose the most stringent restriction possible. This could perhaps
be on account of considerations of fairness or cultural expectations regarding the acceptability and necessity of corruption.
Similarly, the average detection probability in the END treatment, 10.5%, is signiﬁcantly higher than 0% and signiﬁcantly14 Allowing the embezzlement of a larger amount would have likely resulted in a higher level of embezzlement. 
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Table 3 
Regression analysis - Public Oﬃcial A’s choices. 
Treatments variables only Additional controls 
Corrupt choice (Logit) Detection choice - main 
effects (Tobit) 
Detection choice - full 
model (Tobit) 
Corrupt choice (Logit) Detection choice - main 
effects (Tobit) 
Detection choice - full 
model (Tobit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Control Baseline Baseline 
ED 1.639 ∗∗ Baseline Baseline 1.658 ∗∗ Baseline Baseline 
[0.819] [0.821] 
END 1.584 ∗∗ −8.361 ∗∗∗ −9.362 ∗∗∗ 1.582 ∗∗ −7.949 ∗∗∗ −8.827 ∗∗∗
[0.787] [3.021] [3.303] [0.788] [2.966] [3.250] 
XND −0.278 −0.464 
[0.792] [0.822] 
A’s behaviour (Corrupt = 1) −1.068 −0.413 −1.048 
[1.298] [0.891] [1.301] 
END # A’s behaviour (Corrupt = 1) 1.351 1.194 
[1.785] [1.783] 
Age −0.242 ∗ 0.653 0.651 
[0.140] [0.784] [0.786] 
Gender (1 if male) −0.463 −3.703 −3.721 
[0.571] [2.978] [2.986] 
Economics as major 1.030 ∗ −3.406 −3.419 
[0.554] [2.999] [3.007] 
Asked for a bribe (0 if never) −0.418 1.789 1.835 
[0.570] [3.100] [3.109] 
Owns means of transportation 0.262 −4.268 −4.258 
[0.987] [12.426] [12.460] 
Constant 0.787 41.385 ∗∗∗ 17.095 ∗∗∗ 5.848 ∗ 28.070 4.755 
[0.604] [10.725] [2.379] [3.185] [20.427] [17.388] 
Lnsig2u/Sigma_u constant 2.295 ∗∗∗ 11.959 ∗∗∗ 11.989 ∗∗∗ 2.273 ∗∗∗ 11.541 ∗∗∗ 11.574 ∗∗∗
[0.217] [1.222] [1.226] [0.218] [1.180] [1.184] 
Sigma_e constant 9.849 ∗∗∗ 9.844 ∗∗∗ 9.760 ∗∗∗ 9.756 ∗∗∗
[0.256] [0.256] [0.254] [0.254] 
Round ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2620 1320 1320 2620 1320 1320 
Subjects 131 66 66 131 66 66 
Source: Authors’ illustration from own data. 
Note: standard errors in square brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Table 4 
Probability of detection chosen by treatment and type. 
Treatment Type Mean detection probability (%) Standard deviation 
ED Overall 17.21 7.33 
Honest 16.51 7.99 
Corrupt 17.34 6.68 
END Overall 10.52 6.36 
Honest 12.58 7.08 
Corrupt 11.41 7.20 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the experiment. 
Fig. 1. Disaggregated probability choices, by treatment 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 lower than 30% (1% level, one-sample t -test). Public oﬃcials who have the power to set an anti-corruption policy that
will directly impinge on their own ability to be corrupt do not, on average, choose to set the probability of detection and
punishment to zero. We will discuss the implications of these ﬁndings more fully in the concluding section but it is worth
noting in situ that the ﬁrst of these ﬁndings is somewhat disappointing in terms of anti-corruption effort s whereas the
second ﬁnding is encouraging. 
While interesting, these simple comparisons do not quite answer our central research question: Do actors with the abil-
ity to manipulate anti-corruption policies do so when their own corrupt activities will be subject to the monitoring and
punishment mechanism that they select? To answer this question, we must compare the probability choices made under
END and ED. Fig. 1 shows that low levels of probability (15% and below) are the most frequent choices in the END treatment
(up to 75.59% of choices), while these low levels account for only 39.06% of choices in the ED treatment. A chi-square test
conﬁrms that the choices of detection probabilities are signiﬁcantly different between the two treatments (p-value = 0.0 0 0).
It can be noted that in the END treatment a detection probability of 25% or greater was chosen about 17% of the time.
Such possibly puzzling behaviour may be explained by the fact that corruption is considered as “bad” and making no effort
to ﬁght it may provoke cognitive dissonance (see Festinger 1957 ). It may also be the result of subjects engaging in some
risk-seeking behaviour or self-punishment (the so called Dobby effect) due to feelings of guilt or regret for having engaged
in embezzlement (see e.g. Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009 ). 
The average chosen level of monitoring is 17.21% in the ED treatment and 10.52% in the END treatment. We ﬁnd that
the probability of detection is signiﬁcantly lower in the ED treatment compared to the END treatment at the 1% level
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 (p-value = 0.0 0 0, two-sided Mann–Whitney). This fall of nearly 7 percentage points is sizeable given that the possibilities
(discretely) range from 0% to 30%, and given the level of the averages in each treatment. Moving from END to ED would
increase the strength of the anti-corruption policy by around 70% (i.e. on average the chosen probability of detection in-
creases from around 10% to around 17%). A similar result is found by comparing medians. The median probability choices
in the ED treatment is 19.5, while the median in the END treatment is 11.62. The difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level
(p-value = 0.001, Median test). 
We therefore conclude that there exists a statistically signiﬁcant and economically meaningful distortion in anti-
corruption policy-making brought about by a weak institutional framework. Speciﬁcally, it is the interaction of manipu-
lability and equality before the law that leads to worse policy outcomes. Policy makers do not change their embezzlement
behaviour when they too are subject to their policy’s provisions. Rather, they exploit the manipulability of their institutional
setting to opt for a weaker policy. This institutional distortion is sizeable but not complete in that we do see a non-zero
level of anti-corruption monitoring in the END treatment. This is somewhat in line with our theoretical predictions and may
explain why, even in countries that are considered very corrupt, some anti-corruption effort s can be observed. But given that
even low levels of monitoring have been found to be effective deterrents, this is an encouraging ﬁnding that should be of
interest to all parties to anti-corruption, institutional reform, and development efforts. Furthermore, our results support the
idea that shielding the decision maker from punishment or allowing them to shield themselves (at least temporarily) can
provide the incentives needed for them to put into place stricter anti-corruption measures that will beneﬁt society as a
whole. Recall that the decision makers in our ED and END treatments are equally likely to be corrupt. Thus, if the goal is to
reduce the number of corrupt oﬃcials, allowing the decision makers to ‘opt out’ of their own policy can be considered as a
second best solution. 15 
An interesting analysis is to see if the choice of detection level varies according to the choices (corrupt or honest) of Pub-
lic Oﬃcial A. As these decisions can vary across rounds for the same individual, in each round we categorise a participant as
corrupt or honest based on their behaviour in that round. In the ED treatment, corrupt Public Oﬃcial As choose a detection
level (17.34%), which is similar to that of honest Public Oﬃcial As (16.51%). Likewise, in the END treatment, corrupt oﬃcials
choose a similar detection level to that chosen by honest oﬃcials (11.41% versus 12.58%). To analyse the difference between
honest and corrupt oﬃcials in the same treatment, we use Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests pairing the same individual’s
average detection probability when they were corrupt and when they were honest. The differences are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant in the ED treatment (17.34% when corrupt vs 16.51% when honest) or in the END treatment (12.58% when honest
vs 11.41% when corrupt). 16 
However, corrupt Public Oﬃcial As choose a higher detection level in the ED treatment (17.34%) compared to their corrupt
counterparts in the END treatment (11.41%) and the difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-sided Mann–Whitney).
Thus, corrupt oﬃcials tend to distort policy to a greater extent when the policy constrains their own actions. Intentionally,
distorting a policy that is in the public’s interest so that one can continue to act corruptly is in itself a corrupt act. This
self-serving distortion ﬁts the deﬁnition of state capture offered by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) . Thus, these ﬁndings can
be taken as evidence of complementarity between two acts of corruption: embezzlement and institutional distortion. The
observed behaviour is also in line with previous results suggesting that people who are assigned institutional powers will
tend to abuse those powers for their self-interest (see e.g. DeCelles et al., 2012; Kipnis 1972; Kipnis et al., 1980 ). 
In addition, honest Public Oﬃcial As choose a higher detection level in the ED (16.51%) compared to their honest coun-
terparts in the END treatment (12.58%); and the difference is signiﬁcant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.061, two-sided Mann–
Whitney). This shows that even policy makers who have not embezzled and therefore have nothing to fear from the detec-
tion and punishment mechanism choose a lower probability in the END treatment than in the ED treatment. This may be
an unintended consequence of equality before the law in the presence of manipulable institutions. This weak institutional
setting causes even honest policy makers to make socially inferior choices. We suspect that this can be explained by the
fact that very few oﬃcials are fully honest (one in the ED and END treatments; amounting to about 3% in each treatment),
while the majority (56% in the ED treatment and 62% in the END treatment) are corrupt in some periods and honest in
other periods. Such ‘switchers’ may feel some level of understanding and leniency towards corruption even when they are
not partaking themselves in a given period. 
We now proceed to a regression analysis. As the anti-corruption policy had to be chosen from a restricted range of
discrete values, we employ a random-effects two-sided Tobit model for our regression analysis of Public Oﬃcial A’s choice
regarding said policy. 17 Columns 2 and 3 include only the treatments while columns 5 and 6 include additional controls. We
discuss results from columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 , which are consistent with the results of the statistical tests. We ﬁnd that
an honest oﬃcial in the END treatment chooses a lower detection probability that an honest oﬃcial in the ED treatment
and the difference is a statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Column 5). In Column 5, we can also see that, overall, a
corrupt oﬃcial tends to choose a lower detection level compared to an honest oﬃcial, though the effect is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Column 6 includes an interaction term between END and Public Oﬃcial A’s behaviour. We can see that a corrupt
oﬃcial tends to choose a lower detection level compared to an honest oﬃcial in the ED treatment, though the effect is15 Of course, many people would argue that the rule of law has intrinsic value and there are also studies that ﬁnd that it is important for development 
outcomes. For example, Rodrik et al. (2004) conclude that the rule of law is beneﬁcial in terms of income levels. 
16 Note that with this approach, we lose observations for individuals that were always honest or always corrupt in the 20 rounds we are studying. 
17 Using Linear or Ordered Probit panel data models (random effects) give similar results. 
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 not statistically signiﬁcant ( p -value = 0.420). Similarly, by computing the difference between average marginal effects, no
signiﬁcant difference is found between an honest and a corrupt oﬃcial in the END treatment ( p -value = 0.905). Overall, the
Tobit models indicate a weaker anti-corruption policy in the END treatment. However, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference
between honest and corrupt oﬃcials in the choice of detection level either overall or within treatments. 
By comparing the average marginal effects of being corrupt across treatments ED and END, we ﬁnd that corrupt of-
ﬁcials set a signiﬁcantly lower detection level in the END treatment compared to corrupt oﬃcials in the ED treatment
( p -value = 0.011), again suggesting complementarity between embezzlement and institutional distortion as two acts of cor-
ruption. 18 Finally, honest oﬃcials in the END treatment choose a signiﬁcantly lower detection level than honest oﬃcials in
the ED treatment ( p -value = 0.007). The additional control variables in the Tobit regressions are typically not signiﬁcant at
conventional levels. 
5. Conclusion 
This experiment analyses policymakers’ incentives to ﬁght corruption using detection and punishment as an anti-
corruption instrument. There are four treatments in which the institutional environments vary along two dimensions—
equality before the law and manipulability. Equality before the law is the principle that everyone should be treated the
same before the law, while manipulability refers the extent to which institutions can be manipulated by decision makers. 
We ﬁnd that, if given the institutional power to do so, policy makers will distort the anti-corruption instrument to
reduce levels of detection when said instrument impinges, through legal equality, on their own ability to act corruptly.
The magnitude of the distortion is considerable, amounting to about 70% of the average detection level chosen when the
detection probability does not apply to the policy maker. Even honest policy makers enact less stringent detection levels
when they notionally apply to their own actions. Yet, it is important to note that, when institutions are manipulable, policy
makers do not choose a zero level of detection, even when their own corrupt actions can be detected and punished. Corrupt
policy makers in the END treatment choose a less stringent monitoring level than their corrupt counterparts in the ED
treatment when the mechanism also threatens their own payoff. As embezzlement and weaker anti-corruption mechanisms
are both contrary to the public good, this shows that corruption can beget further acts of corruption. 
Policymakers were equally corrupt in both settings. Given that a lower probability of detection and punishment has been
found to increase corruption ( Abbink et al., 2002; Schulze and Frank, 20 03; Olken, 20 07; Hanna et al., 2011 ), assuming the
social goal is to reduce corruption, one might be tempted to evaluate the desirability of legal equality based on the outcome
with regard to the choice of probability of detection. 19 However, Boly et al. (2017) study the corruption decisions of Public
Oﬃcial B and show that in the END treatment higher detection levels do not deter Public Oﬃcial B from embezzling when
Public Oﬃcial A is corrupt. In the ED treatment, Boly et al. (2017) do ﬁnd a deterrent effect even if Public Oﬃcial A is
corrupt. Taken together, these results suggest that legal equality alone is insuﬃcient in the ﬁght against corruption and may
even be counterproductive in some situations. 
Standard caveats regarding the need for further and complementary evidence of course apply to our conclusions. In par-
ticular, anonymity between Public Oﬃcial A and Public Oﬃcial B may not hold in the ﬁeld. Another important caveat, and
one that is addressed in a companion paper, Boly et al. (2017) , is that the corrupt actions of the policy maker and the in-
stitutional setting may (interactively) mitigate the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Even so, the implications of our
ﬁndings are mostly encouraging for those invested in anti-corruption effort s in emerging and developing economies, where
institutional frameworks are often viewed as weak by the standards of developed countries. Encouraging the enactment of
anti-corruption policies may lead to laws with some teeth, even if the law makers themselves stand to lose. An understand-
ing of policymakers’ incentives and a willingness to let them swim through their own net (even temporarily) may serve to
strengthen anti-corruption laws, possibly leading to lower levels of corruption in a society. In this regard, an interesting and
potentially important avenue for further research could build on our framework and investigate whether speciﬁc ‘opt-out’
rules for policy makers have the power to lead to stronger anti-corruption effort s. 
Appendix A: theoretical predictions 
In this section, we discuss some theoretical predictions based on a simple model of expected utility. We focus on the
END treatment, in which detection also applies to Public Oﬃcial A (as shown below, the ED treatment can be seen as a
special case). We assume that an oﬃcial A decides to embezzle if: 
( 1 − p ) U ( E + S ) + pU ( 0 ) > U ( S, v ) (1)
Where p is the probability of detection, U a utility function, E the amount embezzled, S the salary received, and v intrinsic
motivation for honesty. 20 Oﬃcial A receives 0 (i.e. loses both salary and amount embezzled) in case of detection and we18 This analysis was performed using the Stata command “margins” after the regression command. 
19 Some of the 74% of corrupt Public Oﬃcial As may be caught in the END treatment when the probability of detection is non-zero, but this confers no 
social beneﬁt as in the case of detection the funds (and salaries) are returned to the experimenter. 
20 v exists only when Public Oﬃcial A is honest. 
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 assume U(0) = 0 . As a result, an oﬃcial will be corrupt if: 
p < 1 − U ( S, v ) 
U ( E + S ) (2) 
The decision to embezzle or not will depend on p and v , given that S and E are known in our experiment. If we assume
that oﬃcials are risk-neutral and U is additively separable, Eq. (2 ) becomes: 
p < 1 − S + v 
E + S (3) 
• If ( 1 − p ) E − pS < v , indicating that intrinsic motivation is suﬃciently high compared to the expected beneﬁts from em-
bezzlement, there will be no embezzlement. 
• If ( 1 − p ) E − pS > v , meaning that intrinsic motivation is low, there will be embezzlement. 
We use additional assumptions to obtain predictions from our experimental design. For example, let’s assume v = 0 ,
Eq. (3) boils down to: 
p < 1 − S 
E + S 
Given that E = 1 3 S in our design, Public Oﬃcial A will be corrupt if: 
p < 
1 
4 
Relaxing the risk-neutrality assumption would not change the results, except that the right-hand side of the inequality
will be lower. This simple model indicates that detection needs only to be below a certain level but not necessarily equal to
zero in order for a Public Oﬃcial A to expect positive rewards from embezzlement in the END treatment. 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.007 .
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